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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction to decide the issues on appeal in the instant
case pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) (1996). Because the matter comes before the
Court as an appeal of a summary judgment in a civil case not involving domestic relations,
pursuant to Utah Code Ann § 78-2a-3(2) (1996), it is not within the original jurisdiction of
the Utah Court of Appeals, and was, therefore, appropriately transferred to the Utah Supreme
Court. {See R. at 200 for the Court's Order.)
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
ISSUE NO. 1: Whether Craig Curtis Smith ("Smith") is precluded on
appeal from challenging the trial court's factual findings given that he did
not marshal the evidence.
STANDARD OF REVIEW: As has been correctly argued by Four Corners in its
appellate brief, an appellant who attacks the sufficiency of a court's factual findings must first
marshal all of the evidence that supports the court's judgment, and then show that the
evidence cannot support the judgment. Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 766, 769 (Utah
1985).
CITATION TO THE RECORD SHOWING THIS ISSUE WAS PRESERVED IN
THE TRIAL COURT: The requirement of marshaling the evidence arises on appeal.
ISSUE NO. 2: Whether summary judgment in favor of Larry and
Carolyn Randall should be affirmed on the grounds that the Randalls
were clothed with the same governmental immunity from suit as the
Division of Child and Family Services has.
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Summary judgment is proper only when no genuine
issue of material fact exists and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Utah
1

R. Civ. P. 56(c). Whether the trial court's granting of a motion for summary judgment on
grounds of governmental immunity was appropriate is a question of law; the appellate court
accords no deference to the trial court's legal conclusions. Hall v. Utah State Dept. of
Corrections, 24 P.2d 958, 962 (Utah 2001); Wilson v. Valley Mental Health, 969 P.2d 416,
417-18 (Utah 1998). The appellate court resolves only legal issues on an appeal from a
summary judgment; it reviews the trial court's ruling to determine whether the trial court
correctly held that no disputed issues of material fact existed. Taylor v. Ogden School Dist,
927 P.2d 159, 162 (Utah 1996). The granting of a summary judgment can be affirmed "on
any ground available to the trial court, even if not relied on below." Wilson at 418.
CITATION TO THE RECORD SHOWING THIS ISSUE WAS PRESERVED IN
THE TRIAL COURT: The Randalls' Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of
Motion for Summary Judgment (R. at 102-103); Oral Arguments dated March 20,2001, (R.
205, p. 29); and Oral Arguments dated June 19, 2001 (R. at 206, p. 17-21 and 23-25).
ISSUE NO. 3: Whether summary judgment in favor of Larry and
Carolyn Randall was proper on the grounds that Smith did not timely
comply with notice and prelitigation procedures of the Utah Health Care
Malpractice Act, U.C. A. § 78-14-1, etseq. (hereinafter "UHCMA").
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Whether the Randalls, like Four Comer's Mental Health,
were health care providers entitled to the protections of UHCMA is a question of law
reviewed for correctness. Platts v. Helping, 897 P.2d 1228,1230 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). See
the additional standards set forth under Issue No. 2, above.
CITATION TO THE RECORD SHOWING THIS ISSUE WAS PRESERVED IN
THE TRIAL COURT: The Randalls did not argue to the court below that they should be
2

protected by the provisions of the UHCMA. The Court, sua sponte, ruled that the Randalls
were entitled to the same statute of limitations protection as were Four Corners.
ISSUE NO. 4: Whether, as foster parents appointed by the court, the
Randalls are immune from claims of simple negligence.
STANDARD OF REVIEW: As was previously noted, the granting of a summary
judgment can be affirmed "on any ground available to the trial court, even if not relied on
below." Wilson at 418. See also, Straub v. Fisher and Paykel Health Care, 990 P.2d 384,
386 (Utah 1999). Though raised by the Randalls in their Memorandum in Support of Motion
for Summary Judgment, the trial court did not rule on this issue. The Randalls are asking the
court to create a new legal standard in this case that pertains to court-appointed foster
parents, such as the Randalls. Whether this Court should hold that the Randalls are immune
from claims of liability for simple negligence is a mixed question of fact and law. Factual
findings are reviewed for clear error and the legal conclusions for correctness. Nunley v.
Weststates Casing Servs., 989 P.2d 1077,1083 (Utah 1999).
CITATION TO THE RECORD SHOWING THIS ISSUE WAS PRESERVED IN
THE TRIAL COURT: The Randalls' Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of
Motion for Summary Judgment (R. at 102-103) and Oral Arguments dated June 19,2001 (R.
at 206, p. 30).
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ISSUE NO. 5: Whether, as foster parents appointed by the court, the
Randalls had a legal duty to protect Smith from assault by a third
person.
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Again, the granting of a summary judgment can be
affirmed "on any ground available to the trial court, even if not relied on below." Wilson at
418. See also, Straub at 386. Though this issue was raised by the Randalls in their
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment below, the trial court denied
summary judgment on the ground that disputed issues of material fact existed (R. at 188).
The Randalls are asking this Court to create a new legal standard in this case that pertains to
court-appointed foster parents such as the Randalls. Whether this Appellate Court should
hold that the Randalls had a duty to protect to protect Smith from assault by a third person is
a mixed question of fact and law. Factual findings are reviewed for clear error and the legal
conclusions for correctness. Nunley at 1083.
CITATION TO THE RECORD SHOWING THIS ISSUE WAS PRESERVED
IN THE TRIAL COURT: The Randalls' Memorandum of Points and Authorities in
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (R. at 99-101).
ISSUE NO. 6: Whether the trial court committed plain error in granting
summary judgment when discovery requests from Smith to Four
Corner's remained unanswered.
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Trial Courts are given broad discretion over matters
involving discovery, and a court's determination on discovery matters is reviewed for abuse
of discretion. Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239, 1244 (Utah 1980). A review of a grant or
denial of a Rule 56(f) motion is likewise reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard; a
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failure to review missing evidence is not reversible error unless, but for the error, the
outcome of the proceedings would have been different. Berrett v. Denver and Rio Grande
W.R.. 830 P.2d 291, 293 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
CITATION TO THE RECORD SHOWING THIS ISSUE WAS PRESERVED IN
THE TRIAL COURT: Smith raised this issue in his brief. It is the Randalls' and Four
Comer's position that the matter was not properly preserved in the trial court and should not
be considered on appeal.
ISSUE N O . 7 : T he A ffidavit o f T racy M orris c ontains h earsay and
unfounded opinion testimony, and Smith should not be allowed to add
evidence to the record on appeal.
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Pursuant to Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 24(h),
the Randalls hereby adopt by reference the arguments of Four Comers as set forth under
point 6 on pages 20 through 21 of its brief. This issue should be reviewed for clear error.
State v. Parker, 2000 UT 51, f 13, 4 P.3d 778, 781 (Utah 2000).
CITATION TO THE RECORD SHOWING THIS ISSUE WAS PRESERVED IN
THE TRIAL COURT: Defendant Randall's Motion to Strike portions of Tracy Morris
Affidavit and supporting Memorandum (R. at 160-164); Objection to Want Ads, Oral
Argument (R. at 206, pp. 21-22).
KEY STATUTES
The meanings and applications of the following statutes are key in this case:
1. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-4, subsections (3)(b) and (4), in their pertinent parts:
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(b) A plaintiff may not bring or pursue any other civil action or proceeding based
upon the same subject matter against the employee or the estate of the
employee whose act or omission gave rise to the claim, unless:
(i)the employee acted or failed to act through fraud or malice;
(4) An employee may be joined in an action against a governmental entity in a
representative capacity if the act or omission complained of is one for which
the governmental entity may be liable, but no employee may be held personally
liable for acts or omissions occurring during the performance of the employee's
duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of authority, unless it is
established that the employee acted or failed to act due to fraud or malice.
2. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-2(2)(a):
"Employee" includes a governmental entity's officers, employees, servants,
trustees, commissioners, members of a governing body, members of a board,
members of a commission, or members of an advisory body, officers and
employees in accordance with Section 67-5b-104, student teachers certificated
in accordance with Section 53 A-6-101, educational aides, students engaged in
providing services to members of the public in the course of an approved
medical, nursing, or other professional health care clinical training program,
volunteers, and tutors, but does not include an independent contractor."
SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The following statement of the case includes several issues not included in Smith's
brief and also includes references to the record as required in the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure.
During all relevant times in this case, Larry and Carolyn Randall (hereinafter
"Randalls") were court-appointed foster care providers who were licensed, approved and
controlled by the State of Utah, Division of Human Services (also referred to in this matter as
the Division of Child and Family Services (hereinafter collectively referred to as "DHS") (R.
at 002, Yl 7-8). In addition, the Randalls were supervised by Four Corners Mental Health
(hereinafter "Four Corners") (R. at 002, H 9).
6

Appellant Craig Smith claimed that during June 1993, while he was in the Randalls'
care, he was sexually assaulted by another male foster child assigned to the Randalls (R. at
002ffi[13-14). Smith's Complaint alleged that the "Randalls were negligent and left [Smith]
and the other foster placement unattended and without supervision thus allowing the attack
on [Smith] to take place" (R. at 003, ^ 17). Related claims were made against Four Corners
and DHS (R. at 003-004).
DHS filed a motion to dismiss on or about January 7,1999, asserting governmental
immunity (R. at 014-15). Said motion was granted (R. at 026-27). While DHS's dismissal is
not directly challenged in this appeal, it is highly significant because the trial judge
incorporated DHS's arguments and its dispositive ruling on the Motion to Dismiss in
granting the Randall's Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. at 188-89).
During October of 2000, the Randalls and Four Corners filed separate Motions for
Summary Judgment and supporting memoranda (R. at 047-82 and 093-104). In general, the
Randalls asserted that the undisputed facts proved they were not negligent, and the Randalls
claimed that they were protected by the shield of governmental immunity to the same extent
as DHS. Four Corners claimed, among other things, that Smith's claim was time barred
under the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act (hereinafter UHCMA"). Following oral
argument the court granted summary judgment for both parties (R. at 191). With respect to
the Randalls, the trial court concluded that because of their relationship to DHS and Four
Corners, the Randalls were "clothed with the same immunities and statute of limitation
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protection as the Division of Child and Family Services [DHS] and Four Comers Mental
Health" (R. at 189). Smith appeals the summary judgment ruling.
SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENT OF FACTS
Smith has not marshaled the evidence. C onsequently, the Randalls necessarily
supplement the Smith's statement of facts. See Oneida/SLIC v. Oneida Cold Storage, 872
P.2d 1051,1053-54 (UT Ct. App. 1994) (supplemental facts needed when appellant fails to
marshal evidence).
1. Smith erroneously claims in Paragraph 1 of his Brief that the Randalls admitted
during oral arguments that they are not a governmental entity immune from suit under the
Utah Governmental Immunity act. The record does not support that claim. Four Comers
alone admitted that it was not a governmental entity immune from suit. The Randalls, on the
other hand, re-asserted their immunity claim. (Oral Arguments dated June 19, 2001, R. at
206, p. 17-21 and 23-25.)
2. The following statement is contained in the trial court's Memorandum Decision:
"[B]ecause of the relationship of the Randalls with Division of Child and Family Services as
the contractee (foster parents), and also because of the relationship which the Randalls have
with Four Comers Mental Health, that is as foster parents or individuals supervised by/and
for whom services were rendered by Four Comers Mental Health, the arguments which Four
Comers Mental Health makes, which are beneficial to the Randalls as agents of Four Comers
Mental Health as well as the arguments which Division of Child and Family Services
previously made this Court believes controlling." (R. at 188-89.)
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3. The Randall's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (R. at
095-098) sets forth the following undisputed facts supported in the record as indicated:
1.
Onoraboutthe 14th day of January, 1992, Craig Smith ("Smith") was
placed in DHS custody by order of the Seventh Judicial District court.
(Complaint at ^ 7.)
2.
During March, 1992, DHS placed Smith in the home of the Randalls,
persons who were licensed, approved and controlled by DHS as foster parents.
(Larry and Carolyn Randall Affidavit, at ^ 2, hereinafter referred to as the
"Randall Aff.")
3.
During February, 1992, DHS and/or Four Corners placed James Bybee
("Bybee") in the Randall's home. Thus, Bybee was already in the Randall
home at the time Smith was placed in the home. (Randall Aff. at ^f 3.)
4.
At the time Bybee was placed in the Randall's home, the Randalls were
not made aware of or informed in any way that Bybee possessed a violent
character or demonstrated homosexual tendencies. They were not instructed
that he presented a risk of any kind to Smith or anyone else and they were not
told to provide special and/or intensive supervision of Bybee or Smith. In fact,
Bybee was working toward independent living and was under the least
restrictive supervision available in the agency program. (Randall Aff. at ^ 4.)
5.
With full knowledge of the placing agency, Bybee and Smith shared the
same bedroom for almost a year before Bybee left the Randall home in about
February 1993. They did so without incident (other than the normal type of
disputes typically exhibited between brothers who might share a bedroom).
On at least three occasions, the boys were even authorized by the agency to
sleep together outside unsupervised. (Randall Aff. at ^[ 5.)
6.
The Randalls, on their own, did not know and had no reason to know of
Bybee's alleged homosexual and violent tendencies, and at no time had any
reason to suspect that he posed any kind of risk to others, especially boys.
While he was with the Randalls, and even before the incident in question,
Bybee's supervisors allowed him to date females, without supervision. Bybee
dated on various occasions without incident. (Randall Aff. ^ 6.)
7.
Smith claims that during June 1993, Bybee bound Smith with ropes and
also gagged him so he couldn't speak or yell. He then allegedly assaulted
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Smith, touching his penis and anus, and raped him. (See Complaint at ^ 14 & 15.)
8.
At the time of the alleged commission of crimes by Bybee against
Smith, the Randalls had no knowledge of any wrong doing and had no reason
to anticipate or foresee any such problem. To this day, the Randalls are not
sure exactly which night the alleged incidents took place. If they occurred
during sleep outs, there is nothing the Randalls could have done to foresee or
control the situation. The boys had been authorized to sleep out and had been
sleeping unsupervised in the same room for almost three months by that time.
The Randalls reported any allegations they received immediately. (See
Randall Aff. ^| 7). Smith never told the Randalls about the ratpe. The boys
continued living together for up to eight additional months after the alleged
rape and never said anything and did not act as though anything was wrong.
(See Randall Aff. at If 7.)
9.
Smith remained in the Randall home after Bybee left. The Randalls had
a great relationship with Smith. Smith fit in perfectly with their family. The
Randalls loved Smith and would have gladly adopted Smith had they been
given the opportunity (Smith would have been returned to the Randall home a
short time after first leaving but sadly they were not allowed to take him
because they had two other boys in their home at that time). The Randalls
frequently engaged in open dialogue with Smith and never detected any
problem. (See Randall Aff. at ^ 8.)
10. The Randalls were shocked about the accusations when they learned of
them. In part, they were surprised because they felt that Smith was stronger
and tougher than Bybee and would have never allowed such an incident to
occur. (See Randall Aff. at U 9.)
11.
At all times in question, the Randalls provided proper care and
supervision over Smith and Bybee. (See Randall Aff. at ^ 10.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The trial court correctly concluded that because of the relationship between DHS and
the Randalls, who at all times relevant herein were serving as court-appointed foster parents,
the Randalls were cloaked with governmental immunity to the same extent as DHS. Smith
cannot challenge the factual findings pertaining to the relationship between the Randalls and
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DHS, or any other factual matters, because he failed to marshal the evidence supporting the
Court's findings. The appellate court should accept the trial court's factual findings as valid.
Based on the doctrine of "law of the case," it is incontrovertible that DHS was
immune from suit under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10,
as a governmental entity that was engaged in a governmental function when the alleged
assault took place. Because of and their relationship to DHS as court-appointed foster
parents, the Randalls' were "employees" under the Act and are likewise immune from suit
pursuant to the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.
Furthermore, the Randalls were protected by the provisions of the Utah Health Care
Malpractice Act ("UHCMA") found at Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-14-1 to 78-14-16. The trial
court, sua sponte, ruled that the Randalls were entitled to the same UHCMA statute of
limitation protection as Four Corners. At the time of the incident in question, Four Corners
was a "health care provider" under the UHCMA. Because of the special relationship
between the Randalls and Four Corners, the Randalls were agents of Four Comers and, thus,
protected under the UHCMA. Smith failed to timely file the required notice of intent to
commence action, failed to seek prelitigation panel review as required under the UHCMA,
and is thus barred by the statute of limitations from pursuing a UHCMA claim against the
Randalls.
The Randalls also assert that foster parents cannot be held liable for acts or omissions
involving simple negligence. They request that the court adopt the common law principle
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that parents, or those standing in loco parentis (such as foster parents), can only be held
liable for willful or wanton misconduct toward children in their care.
As another alternative argument, the Randalls argue that no special relationship
existed between them and the foster placements, including Smith. Since there was no special
relationship, the Randalls did not owe a duty of care to Smith and, therefore, cannot be held
liable for damages sustained by Smith on the theory of simple negligence.
Additionally, the Randalls argue that the court should reject Smith's complaints
regarding Four Corner's failure to fully respond to interrogatories. Smith did not properly
preserve the matter in the court below. He failed to file a motion under URCP 56(f) and did
not file a motion to compel.
Finally, as to the last two arguments, the Randalls adopted the arguments of Four
Comers. The court should disregard the inadmissible hearsay and opinion statements
contained in the affidavit of Tracy Morris and should disregard the want ad that was
improperly offered into evidence by Smith during oral arguments.
ARGUMENTS
I.

Smith Failed to Properly Marshall the Evidence and Is Precluded
from Challenging the Trial Courts Factual Findings.

Pursuant to Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 24(h), the Randalls hereby adopt by
reference the arguments of Four Comers as set forth under point 4 on pages 19 through 20 of
its Brief. Because Smith has made no attempt to marshal the evidence, he should not be
allowed to challenge on appeal the court's factual findings regarding the relationship between
the Randalls and DHS and the Randalls and Four Comers.
12

II.

The Randalls Were Clothed with the Same Governmental
Immunity as the Division of Child and Family Services.

The trial court's legal conclusion that the Randalls were clothed with governmental
immunity to the same extent as the Division of Child and Family Services, referred to herein
as "DHS," can best be understood by simultaneously keeping in mind two key rulings in the
court below. First, the trial court ruled on a Motion to Dismiss filed by DHS that DHS was
immune from suit in this case (R. at 026-27). Smith has not appealed that ruling. Second, in
granting summary judgment in favor of the Randalls, the trial court explicitly incorporated
and relied upon the arguments raised by DHS in its Motion to Dismiss; the trial court
concluded that the Randalls were immune from suit to the same extent as DHS (R. at 18889). The import of each of these issues is explained below.
In its Motion to Dismiss, DHS successfully argued that it was immune from suit
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10, which provides, in relevant part:
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury
proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee committed
within the scope of employment except if the injury arises out of, in connection
with, or results from: . . . . (2) assault, battery, false imprisonment. . . .
The trial court specifically adopted DHS's factual and legal arguments and concluded
that DHS was immune from suit for the alleged assault pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-3010(2) (R. at 027). As supporting legal precedent, the trial court relied upon the legal
doctrines set forth in Ledfors v. Emery County School District, 849 P.2d 1162 (Utah 1993)
(school district immunized from suit arising out of battery of student by two fellow students;
court to focus on the conduct out of which the injury arose, not the legal theory crafted by
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plaintiff) and Sheffield v. Turner, 445 P.2d 367 (Utah 1968) (warden and prison officials
immune from suit where one inmate has injured another).
Smith did not appeal or in any way challenge the trial court's ruling that DHS was
immune from suit in this case. Thus, the court's factual and legal conclusions on that issue
are conclusive in this appeal, i.e., DHS was a governmental entity performing a governmental
function and the alleged harm against Smith constituted an assault and/or battery; therefore,
DHS was immune from suit by Smith against it. See e.g., Thurston v. Box Elder County, 892
P.2d 1034,1037 (Utah 1995) ("law of the case" doctrine provides that decision made on an
issue during one stage of case is binding in successive stages of same litigation).
Given the law of this case, the sole question now before this Court on the issue of
immunity is whether the Randalls, who were acting as court-appointed, foster parents at the
time of the alleged assault and battery, are cloaked with the same immunity as DHS. The
trial court correctly concluded that they were.
It is an undisputed fact in this case that "Smith was placed in DHS custody by order
of the Seventh Judicial District Juvenile Court" and that "DHS placed Smith in the home of
the Randalls, persons who were licensed, approved and controlled by DHS as foster parents"
(R. at 002, ffl[ 7 &8). Based on such facts,1 the trial court logically concluded that the
Randalls had a relationship with DHS as "contractee[s] (foster parents)" and that based on
that legal relationship the Randalls were "clothed with the same immunities" as DHS (R. at
188-89). In reaching that conclusion, the trial court explicitly incorporated the arguments
l

The trial court does not detail the factual basis for its conclusion.
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made by DHS in its successful Motion to Dismiss (R. at 189). The trial court correctly and
necessarily concluded that the Randalls were employees of a governmental entity and,
therefore, were immune from suit for the injuries arising out of the alleged assault and
battery.
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-4, subsections (3)(b) and (4), in their pertinent parts, provide:
(b) A plaintiff may not bring or pursue any other civil action or proceeding
based upon the same subject matter against the employee or the estate of the
employee whose act or omission gave rise to the claim, unless:
(i) the employee acted or failed to act through fraud or malice;
(4) An employee may be joined in an action against a governmental entity
in a representative capacity if the act or omission complained of is one for
which the governmental entity may be liable, but no employee maybe held
personally liable for acts or omissions occurring during the performance of
the employee's duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of
authority, unless it is established that the employee acted or failed to act
due to fraud or malice.
(Emphasis added).
An "employee" is defined in Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-2(2)(a) as follows:
[A] governmental entity's officers, employees, servants, trustees,
commissioners, members of a governing body, members of aboard, members
of a commission, or members of an advisory body, officers and employees in
accordance with Section 67-5b-104, student teachers certificated in accordance
with Section 53A-6-101, educational aides, students engaged in providing
services to members of the public in the course of an approved medical,
nursing, or other professional health care clinical training program, volunteers,
and tutors, but does not include an independent contractor."
The Randalls were employees or servants of DHS and, therefore, "employees" under
the Governmental Immunity Act. As court-appointed foster parents, they were "licensed,
controlled and supervised" by DHS (R at 002, ^ 8). As employees of DHS, they are entitled
15

to the same immunity as their governmental employer. That conclusion is consistent with
the language and intent of the Governmental Immunity Act. In articulating its reasoning as to
why a prison warden is immune from suit for negligent acts under the Governmental
Immunity Act, the Utah Supreme Court in Sheffield, supra at 369, spoke of "the imperative
need for those in a supervisory capacity to have reasonable freedom to discharge the
burdensome responsibilities of keeping in confinement and maintaining discipline of a large
number of men who have been convicted of serious crime." The Court further stated:
If such officials are too vulnerable to lawsuits for anything untoward which
may happen to inmates a number of evils follow, including a breakdown of
discipline and the fact that capable persons would be discouraged from taking
such public positions.
Foster parents too have an imperative need for reasonable freedom to discharge the equally
burdensome, yet incomparably sacred, responsibilities of child-rearing, and all that it entails.
Like other public servants whose duties immerse them in dealing with people of varying
background and behavior, foster parents deserve protection from tort liability for simple
instances of negligence.
But unlike a prison warden, foster parents often have an even greater responsibility to
shelter, feed, clothe, discipline, and provide loving care for troubled, >>e/ dependent, youths,
without the benefit of on-site security staff, 'round the clock surveillance capabilities, and
detention facilities. Therefore, foster parents should be shown greater protection from tort
liability in relation to the children in their care.
Parenthood, like childhood, is an inherently risky undertaking. As the events ofjust
the past few months have so starkly shown, even the most loving and responsible parents,
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despite their best efforts, cannot protect their child from the vicissitudes of life or from the
depraved who prey upon the innocent and the vulnerable. The foster parent program provides
needy children and the State with an overwhelmingly superior (and considerably less costly)
alternative to the fate such children and society would otherwise confront. Adopting a simple
negligence standard for such a program would not only chill the willingness of potential
foster parents, but among existing foster parents would dictate "defensive parenting"
concerned more with risk avoidance and self-preservation than the self-sacrifice that decent
parenting demands.
Accordingly, state-appointed foster parents in general (and the Randalls specifically
under the facts of this case) should be deemed governmental employees under the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act who are immune from suit under the provisions of the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act. In this case, the trial court properly concluded that the
Randalls, as court-appointed and DHS supervised foster parents, were clothed with the same
governmental immunity as DHS.2

2

See, e.g., Pickett v. Washington Ctv, 572 P.2d 1070, 1073-74 (Oregon Ct. App.
1977)(foster parents generally immune from liability for acts and omissions relating to provision,
care, and custody of a ward).
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III.

Smith failed to timely comply with notice and prelitigation
procedures of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act ("UHCMA").

As has been previously noted, the Randalls did not argue in the court below that they
should be protected by the provisions of the UHCMA. The Court, sua sponte, ruled that the
Randalls were entitled to the same statute of limitations protection as Four Comers. Pursuant
to Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 24(h), the Randalls hereby generally adopt by reference
the arguments of Four Comers as set forth under point two on pages 14 through 16 of its
brief. What follows is an explanation of why or how the legal principles discussed by Four
Comers are applicable to the Randalls, as well.
The Randalls are protected by the provisions of the UHCMA under the narrow and
specific facts of this case. The trial court made a factual finding that due to the relationship
between the Randalls and Four Comers, the Randalls were "agents" of Four Comers and
"individuals supervised by/and for whom services were rendered by Four Comers Mental
Health" (R. at 188-89). As agents of Four Comers, they are entitled to the same notice as
Four Comers. The definition of "Health Care Provider" under Utah Code Ann. § 78-143(11), includes "agents" of the defined "health care providers.
The trial court's factual conclusion regarding the Randalls' relationship to Four
Comers cannot be challenged in this appeal because of Smith's failure to marshal the
evidence. The Randalls, as agents of Four Comers, were properly granted summary
judgment because Smith failed to timely and properly file suit under the UHCMA.
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IV.

As F oster P arents A ppointed b y t he C ourt, t he R andalls Are
Immune from the Claims of Simple Negligence Alleged by Smith.

In his Complaint Smith alleges that the "Randalls were negligent and left Craig and
the other foster placements unattended and without sufficient supervision, thus allowing the
attack on [the victim] to take place." (R. at 17.) If, for the sake of argument, such an
allegation were deemed an instance of negligence on the part of the Randalls, the Randalls
nevertheless contend that as a matter of law, Utah foster parents in general (and the Randalls
specifically under the facts of this case) should be shielded from liability for merely negligent
acts or omissions when one of their foster placements harms another foster placement.
Inasmuch as there appears to be no controlling case or statutory law on this issue in this
jurisdiction, it appears to be an issue of first review.
Under the common law, parents are generally immune from suit by their children in
cases involving simple negligence. Elkington v. Faust, 618 P.2d 37,40 (Utah 1980). See
e.g. Brown v. Phillips, 362 S.E.2d 786 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986) and Horton v. Reaves, 526 P.2d
304 (Colo. 1974) (discussing and adopting common law doctrine of parental immunity for
negligent acts or omissions). The Randalls urge that the common law principle of parental
immunity for the negligent acts of parents be acknowledged and/or extended to the Randalls
and other foster parents. "When one stands in loco parentis to another, the rights and

3

Elkington involved intentional sexual assault and abuse. The Utah Supreme Court
acknowledged the common law concept of parental immunity but noted (in dicta) that the trend is
awayfromimmunity. Without ruling on the issue of parental immunity for negligent actions, the
Court found that given the facts of the case the abuser clearly did not have a claim for immunity.
Elkington v. Faust, 618 P.2d 37, 40 (Utah 1980).
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liabilities arising out of that relation are, as the words imply, exactly the same as between
parent and child." Gribble v. Gribble, 583 P.2d 64, 66 (Utah 1978) (quoting Sparks v.
Hinkley, 78 Utah 502, 5 P.2d 570 (1931). Given that parental immunity is the law of this
jurisdiction, as well as the other arguments against a simple negligence standard provided
supra, Foster parents, who stand in loco parentis to the foster placements, should be
accorded the common law shield against claims by their foster children for simple
negligence/
V.

As foster parents appointed by the court, the Randalls had no legal
duty to protect Smith from or warn him of the risk of assault by a
third person.

Pursuant to Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 24(h), the Randalls hereby generally
adopt by reference the arguments of Four Corners as set forth under point three on pages 16
through 19 of its brief. What follows is an explanation of why or how the legal principles
discussed by Four Corners are applicable to the Randalls, as well.
In general, there is no duty to control the conduct of others, except in certain
situations such as when a special relationship exists. Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d
231, 235 (Utah 1993). Utah courts have taken a "policy-based approach" in ascertaining
whether a special relationship exists. Id. Such determination "requires careful consideration
of the consequences of imposing that duty for the parties and for society." Id. (citations

4

The Georgia Court of Appeals specifically concluded that foster parents, in their standing in
loco parentis, were in every way entitled to immunity from suit by children in their care, just as
regular parents, absent findings of willful and malicious conduct. Brown v. Phillips, 342 S.E.2d
786, 788 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986).
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omitted). Appellate courts have been "loath to recognize a duty that is realistically
incapable of performance or fundamentally at odds with the nature of the parties'
relationship." Id. (citations omitted). The Court should examine the following factors in
determining whether a special relationship exists: the identity and character of the parties
involved, the relationship of the parties to each other and the "practical impact" that finding a
special relationship would have. Id, (citations omitted).
The Higgins court set forth the following guiding principles in cases like this one:
In the context of a claim that an actor having custody or control of another
owed a duty to prevent harm to or by that other, our overriding practical
concern is whether the one causing the harm has shown him- or herself to be
uniquely dangerous so that the actor upon whom the alleged duty would fall
can be reasonably expected, consistent with the practical realities of that
actor's relationship to the one in custody or under control, to distinguish that
person from others similarly situated, to appreciate the unique threat this
person presents, and to act to minimize or protect against that threat. When
such circumstances are present, a special relationship can be said to exist and a
duty sensibly may be imposed.
Id. (citations omitted).
Applying the forgoing legal principles to the facts in question in this case, the Randalls did
not have a special relationship with Smith. In their role as foster parents over the two
placements, the Randalls were subject to the orders of a court, the directions of DHS, and the
supervision of Four Corners. They had no control over the details of their supervision and
merely followed directions from those above them. Smith and the alleged perpetrator shared
the same bedroom for almost a year without incident. The Randalls had no indication
whatsoever that the alleged perpetrator had the inclination to rape, might attempt to rape, or
could succeed in his attempt to rape, his male roommate.
21

As foster parents in this case the Randalls simply did not know or have reason to
suspect that Bybee was a threat to Smith. They had no practical means of appreciating or
recognizing the risk, and thus, no way to protect against it. On the night that Smith was
allegedly attacked, the Randalls were following guidance from their supervisors who said the
boys could sleep out unsupervised.
If the Randalls are held liable on the theory of simple negligence for the actions of a
foster child 1) who over the course of almost a year gave no indications of being a threat to
Smith in any way, 2) of whom Smith did not complain to the Randalls, after for months after
the alleged assault occurred; and 3) over whom they had limited or no practical control, a
pervasive chilling effect on state foster care programs is to be expected. It is the very nature
of the foster care programs that parents receive at-risk children who are typically troubled in
one way or another. If foster parents are to be held liable for negligent supervision of such
children, then it is probable that many couples will choose to not take in and care for such
children. The Randalls, therefore, as foster parents, did not have a special relationship with
either foster child. As a consequence, they owed no duty to prevent Smith's alleged harm
and cannot be held liable for its occurrence.
VI.

Smith did not properly preserve his claim that the trial c ourt
committed plain error in granting summary judgment when
discovery requests from Smith to Four Corner's remained
unanswered.

Pursuant to Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 24(h), the Randalls hereby adopt by
reference the arguments of Four Corners as set forth under point 5 on page 20 of its brief. In
addition, the Utah Supreme Court has emphasized that Rule 56(f) is intended to ensure that
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diligent parties are given an adequate opportunity for discovery. Brown v. Glover, 16 P.3d
540,547 (Utah 2000). The court added: "An attorney has a professional responsibility to 'act
with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client.' Therefore, an attorney
has a responsibility to use the available discovery procedures to diligently represent her
client. The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provide the means to do this." Id (Citations
omitted). Smith did not even file a motion under Rule 56(f). He cannot now benefit from his
own lack of diligence. Smith's complaints about discovery are ill-timed and unfounded.
VII. The Affidavit of Tracy Morris contains hearsay and unfounded
opinion testimony and Smith should not be allowed to added
evidence to the record on appeal.
Pursuant to Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 24(h), the Randalls hereby adopt by
reference the arguments of Four Corners as set forth under point 6 on pages 20 through 21 of
its brief.
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT
Based on the forgoing, the summary judgment in the Randalls favor should be
affirmed and the Randalls should be awarded their costs under Utah Rule of Appellate
Procedure 34(a).
An Addendum is not necessary.
Dated this 29th day of July 2002.
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